The story of the movement for gender equality in post-revolution Egypt is, unsurprisingly, complex and features thousands of key actors, incidents, failures and successes. It is an important template for resistance, mobilization, and steadfastness. The history of the women’s revolution is populated with distinct characters, whose contributions to the dialogue and wider movement, positive and negative, intentional and unintentional, enable us to better understand the challenges, the changes, and the way ahead. The women, men, and groups mentioned in the following are not necessarily the most important players in the history of the women’s revolution since 2013. Instead, I introduce them and their stories as points of entry for readers new to the key themes and currents of the movement for gender equality in Egypt, and/or as examples of distinct challenges and responses (sexual harassment, for example.) The following is a brief history of the women’s revolution from the 30th June 2013 to the present day, and is the second in the series ‘Women’s Rights in Post-Revolution Egypt’. Part I is available here.
Writing on the walls
By the time I arrived in Cairo in late May 2013, the discontent at the Islamist domination of the Shura Council had gone beyond expressions of no-confidence, and an uprising seemed imminent. On my late-night journey between Cairo International and Sixth October City, the word ‘Rebel’, in English, glowed periodically along the 70km route as it was hit with the headlights, and the following day I noticed the words ‘down with the brotherhood’ scrawled on the walls of the National Military Museum. The same afternoon, while walking through Midan el-Tahrir, a teenager showed me his arms, slashed by police, and a small group of protesters ran through traffic to my side of the Midan and posed for photographs in the hope that I was a journalist. The Midan was empty in May 2013 but of people about their daily business and those left behind by the revolution. Elsewhere, cars queued for hours to buy solar, an energy source in short supply since the government ran out of money to subsidize it in early 2013. In some districts, streetlights were left on all day and turned off at night. Rumours about Islamists visiting rural areas and promoting FGM were circulating. The discontent and the fury was tangible in homes, and in cafes and on the street.
The June 30th protests, which began prematurely on the 28th, were marked by unprecedented and horrific levels of sexual violence against women. By the 9thJuly, 186 reported incidents of sexual assault against women in Tahrir and the surrounding areas had occurred, including gang rapes and rape with a bladed weapon. On 3rd July, Mohammed Morsi was overthrown in military coup d’état, arrested with other high-ranking members of The Muslim Brotherhood, and replaced by Adly Mansour, formerly Chief Justice of the Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt. The coup received widespread support from the public, from religious leaders, and from opposition groups. Additionally, and importantly, many describe the uprising as a revolution rather than a coup. In the introduction to my first piece on the status of women in post-revolution Egypt, I noted that revolutions are deeply personal and, as such, it is not appropriate to define the actions of the people as revolutionary or otherwise. We can, however, affirm that the military itself did instigate a coup d’état. Thus, I will refer to the events around June 30th as a coup only when describing the actions of the military, and an uprising when discussing the actions of the street.
Life Above Ground
The Arab Spring turned women’s issues into a battle in the war of ideology between Islamists and so-called modernists. Both see women through a traditional lens and have deprived them of full participation in the political process. But women are not silent in this historical moment.i
Zainab Salbi, 15th November 2013
Following the coup, the military suspended the Egyptian Constitution of 2012, a key source of dispute between civil society and the government; a dispute which further fueled the discontent of the people at the lack, and even reversal, of visible social and economic development following the revolution in 2011.
The 8th July Constitutional Declaration, issued by interim President of Egypt Adly Mansour, decreed that a legal committee of 10 experts be created within 15 days with the aim of drafting amendments to the suspended Constitution of 2012 within the month. Following this, the new draft was to be submitted to a 50-member committee representative of all demographics, including at least ten women and young people. Within sixty days, Egypt’s new constitution was to be drafted and presented for Presidential and public scrutiny.
Ultimately, both committees proved to be examples of gender inequality within political and transitional processes. At this, the very first opportunity to create policy that served women and minorities following the coup, the state overwhelmingly failed to include women in the decision-making process. The Committee of Experts included no women ‘despite the availability of female justices with proven competence… as well as many female Professors of constitutional law in law faculties throughout all governorates of Egypt’.ii Further, the 50 member committee contained only five female members and six auxiliary female members. The Egyptian Centre for Women’s Rights (ECWR) reported that by August 2013 female representation in the Cabinet was only 8%, with only three female ministers out of 35 members of the Cabinet. Egypt had no female governors, and no new female judges were appointed. The last female judge was appointed in 2007, bringing the total number of female judges in Egypt to 42.iii
Crucially, however, the new draft constitution featured significant developments for women, including a quota of 25% for female parliamentarians, an order to establish a commission to end gender discrimination, obligatory education to high school (helping to reduce early marriage), a call to end human trafficking, and a commitment to all human rights and international agreements signed by Egypt. Additionally, a 25% quota for women in municipal councils guaranteed approximately 13,000 seats for women in councils.iv
On the 14th January 2014, Egypt entered its first day of the Referendum on the new Constitution. ECWR reported ‘big numbers of women since the early hours of the day, from different ages and social classes’ attended the polling stations.v There was extensive logistical and administrative facilitation of women’s voting during the referendum, however intimidation and other violations were reported.vi The 2014 Constitution was approved by 98.1% (although turnout was only 38.6%).
On the 23rd February 2014, it was announced that Hala Shukrallah, a Coptic Christian, won the presidency of Al-Dostor Party (Constitution Party) with 53% of the vote. Commenting on her victory, ECWR declared Shukrallah’s election ‘not a personal victory as much as victory for the Egyptian women and her ability to compete fairly if the political parties’ life were objective and healthy’.vii
The following day, the Cabinet and its Prime Minister, Hazem Beblawi, resigned unexpectedly and without reason, though popular strikes and the war waged on the Muslim Brotherhood and its sympathisers by the State Security apparatus were widely cited as the cause. On the 25th, Housing Minister Ibrahim Mehleb, a former high-ranking member of the Mubarak’s National Democratic Party, was appointed Prime Minister by President Adly Mansour.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Mehleb government contained only four female ministers, two of whom were ministers in the previous government. This brought the share of women in government to 12%, a ‘danger sign’, according to ECWR, a violation of Article 11 of the 2014 Constitution which guarantees adequate representation for women, and falling short of the 25% quota allocated to women in local councils in article 180.viii
On the 26th March 2014, Field Marshall Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi announced his intentions to run for president following a popular campaign by the public, Kamel Gamelak (finish your favour). Sisi, who instigated the coup in 2013, had gained major public support despite a crackdown on ‘terror’ which left 1,150 dead, according to Human Rights Watch.ix Between July 2013 and July 2014, the number of Egyptians detained was reported at anywhere between 16,000 and 40,000 and countless horrific testimonies of torture have been reported by survivors.x
Between May 2014 and July 2015, both the military and security apparatus actively harassed and intimidated women as part of the government’s programme of repression (towards political movements), oppression (of the street and the general public), and destruction (of civil society). In particular, politically active women were targeted and state intimidation of civil society featured sexual harassment of female workers and activists, which the Egyptian Initiative For Personal Rights (EIPR) states ‘can only be considered an attempt to discourage females from participating in the public space’.xi In May of 2014, state security raided, for the second time in six months, the Alexandria branch of the Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights during a press conference in solidarity with imprisoned activist Mahinour Al-Massry, arresting 15, confiscating computers and files, and sexually harassing the women who were present. A few days later, Sisi won the two-man race to the Presidency with 96.1% of the vote (47.5% turnout).xii
The public frenzy surrounding Sisi is unlike anything seen since the time of Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt’s second President (1956-1970). Like Sisi, Nasser too came to power by orchestrating a military coup. He is, arguably, Egypt’s most loved President, and to this day remains a symbol of unity between the people and the military. Following the revolution of 2011, posters bearing an image of a soldier carrying a child, emblazoned with the words ‘The people and the military are one hand’, appeared widely in Egypt.
A study published in December 2013 reveals that 71% of Egyptians favour military rule, and 90% of respondents claimed that they are proud to be Egyptian.xiii This relationship is a key factor when examining the status of women in Egypt as military worship has historically fuelled the jingoism and extremist nationalism that has actively fostered the culture of silence, victim blaming, and impunity that has most threatened the safety of women, and ultimately damaged their status in the workplace, home, and on the street.
A lack of concern for a woman’s wellbeing and her right to make decisions about her body, as well as the culture of victim-blaming, the taboo that prohibits discussion about Egypt’s social ills, and the absolute and historic tenet that one does not criticise the military all amounts to a culture of absolutely impunity not only for civilians but also and especially for the military. A symptom of this culture is selective memory, and this is why wider society is able to either defend or entirely forget that Sisi publicly defended forced virginity tests, torture, and sexual harassment of female protesters in 2011, and subsequently install him as President.
Despite a clear absence of progress for women in public life, women were, as Zainab Salbi declared in her article for the Guardian, ‘not silent in this historic moment’. Women are among the most fearless and dedicated opponents to the state’s programme of repression, oppression, and destruction since the coup. In the case of Yara Sallam, for instance, a movement of female judges and lawyers from across the Arab world led the calls for her release after she was arbitrarily arrested and detained under the contentious and unconstitutional Protest Law. Sallam, a researcher at the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, was arrested with over thirty others on June 21st 2014 after participating in a peaceful demonstration in protest of the Protest Law, detained for several months and sentenced to two years in prison at El-Qaneter prison, one of the prisons in which horrific sexual violence and torture against women routinely takes place, according to detainees.xiv On the 10th September 2014, a group of female lawyers sent a letter demanding the immediate release of Sallam to the head of the Egyptian Supreme Judicial Council. The letter went ignored, and Sallam remains in prison still.
In a society hostile to women, especially women who participate in politics, civil society has been a consistent advocate, a safe space, a key resistor to state violations and intimidation. However, in November 2014, Egyptian civil society chose not to participate in the Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review before the UN in Geneva out of fear of reprisals, choosing instead to support recommendations made by the Forum of Egyptian Independent Human Rights Organizations to the UPR, and cancelling scheduled events and conferences scheduled at the UPR. In a press release, EIPR claims that consultation of civil society has reached an all time low. ‘The undersigned organizations see a stark difference between the government’s preparations for the UPR this year and the government’s preparations for the UPR in 2010. The committee tasked with writing the government report for the UPR in 2010 reached out to human rights organisations, including some of the undersigned organizations, seeking consultations about its report and asking for advise about the recommendations it should accept. The committee tasked with writing the government’s report this year did not seek meetings with human rights organisations, feeling it sufficient to meet once with a few select rights organisations and members of the National Council for Human Rights one week before the UPR session. Contrary to its obligations, the government of Egypt did not attempt to contact the undersigned organisations in the process of writing the government’s report’.xv
Two of these organisations included the new Woman Foundation and the Nazra for Feminist Studies, key players in the movement for gender equality in Egypt, among five other organisations who have also contributed significantly towards the movement as part of a wider body of work on human rights: Arabic Network for Human Rights Information (ANHRI), EIPR, The Cairo Institute for human Rights Studies (CIHRS), the Egyptian Centre for Economic and Social Rights (ECESR), and the Association for freedom of Thought and Expression (AFTE).
The loss of these key voices at the UPR will undoubtedly have damaged the representation of Egyptian women (among other groups suffering rights violations) on an international scale, allowing the government to de-emphasise the scale of violations against women, and ultimately minimizing the urgency with which the international community will respond.
In The Bedroom (Home politics)
We got hurt side by side with the men, albeit in different ways. But I wanted to take that political revolution a bit further and ask, when I look to my right and I look to my left and I see the male comrades, how revolutionary are they when they go home? Because there’s this very naïve idea that if men are revolutionaries outside on the street against the patriarchs, they’re somehow a feminist.
-Mona Eltahawy, 30th March 2014
Despite the introduction of some safeguards for women in the 2014 Constitution, marital rape remains legal, and intimate partner violence is still not recognised under the law. In addition, adultery laws discriminate against women, and little or no protection exists for women from social and familial pressures and punishments doled out by families and communities.
In addition, harmful views and traditions persist, and hinder efforts to combat gender inequality in the home. Shari’a law, for example, is often used as a defence in cases of domestic violence, of which few are made since domestic violence is not illegal (Law 6/1998 makes intimidation or threat against a wife, child, or parent a criminal act, going some way towards protecting women).
A paper published by the University of Maryland in December 2013 revealed crucial information about the views of Egyptians on marriage, gender equality and nationalism. Only 30% of Egyptians believe that love should be the basis of marriage over parental approval, and only 5% disagree with the statement ‘a wife must always obey her husband’. 70% of Egyptians either strongly disagree or disagree with the statement ‘it is acceptable for a man to have more than one wife’. Only 14% of Egyptians believe that women have the right to dress as they wish.
Interestingly, 56% of respondents to the study support Shari’a Law, but 73% favour a government ‘that makes laws according to the people’s wishes versus the one that implements only the shari’a’. Only 14% of respondents disagree or strongly disagree with the statement ‘when jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women’, and 65% of Egyptians do not support gender equality in education.xvi
In 2014, a landmark case was made against two men who were investigated and tried for offences relating to Female Genital Mutilation (FGM). FGM is still widely practiced in Egypt despite being banned in 2008, largely because it is considered a private family matter. Consequently, perpetrators are rarely reported, investigated and, before 2014, never tried in court- bar the landmark case in 2014 in which the thirteen year old victim’s father and the doctor who performed the procedure were tried for death by negligence after the victim, Sohair al-Bata’a, was forced to undergo an FGM procedure. It is the first time anyone has been charged with offences relating to FGM since the Penal Code was amended in 2011 following the death of an eleven year old girl, making performing FGM a punishable offence.xvii Speaking to The Guardian after the men were acquitted in November, Atef Aboelenein, a lawyer at the Women’s Centre for Guidance and Legal Awareness and one of the many activists who pursued the case against the men, said ‘Of course there will be no stopping any doctor after this. Any doctor can do any FGM he wants now’.xviii However, following an appeal, both men were sentenced in January 2015; the doctor jailed for two years in prison with hard labour, and the father handed a suspended sentence of three months in prison.xix Small victories like this set a significant and vital precedent, more so since this case was the first of its kind.
A survey released in 2015 by the Ministry of Health revealed that approximately 92% of married Egyptian women have undergone an FGM procedure, despite the 2008 ban and Egypt’s Grand Mufti condemning the practice, as well as efforts by activists and civil society to increase awareness about the long-term health risks surrounding FGM, which involves the partial or entire removal of the external genitalia.xx The practice is widely considered to be a religious requirement, though there is no evidence to substantiate this, and activists maintain that FGM is a cultural practice. Many parents who have had their daughters mutilated believe that FGM protects a girl from promiscuity and increases her value as a bride.
The Egyptian Constitution 2014 declared that all people below the age of eighteen are children, however the legal age of marriage is set at eighteen for men and sixteen for women, meaning that women can be married before they reach the age of adulthood. Poverty and gender inequality are the primary reasons why child marriage persists in Egypt, with rates of child marriage considerably higher in poor and rural areas, and reaching as high as 38% in Port Said and Fayoum.xxi
Plan reports that 21% of women were married before the age of fifteen in the areas in Egypt in which it works. ‘Early and forced marriage puts a girl’s health and wellbeing at serious risk. It can lead to girls experiencing violence, sexual abuse, premature pregnancies, and death in childbirth. Once married many girls are forced out of schools, which not only denies them the chance to learn but limits their income in future’.xxii The National Council for Women reports that 22% of Egyptian girls are married before their eighteenth birthday, while Girls Not Brides reports the rate at 17%, and claims that child marriage is on the rise in Upper Egypt, among other areas. In response, the government developed a national strategy between November 2013 and June 2014, aimed at halving the prevalence of child marriage within five years, and addressing child marriage within the context of a health and population issue.xxiii
Marriage and adultery laws continue to discriminate against women. In an article for Madamasr titled ‘Fight the man: Laws that help women and laws that hurt them’, the author sets out the principal (and most harmful) laws that affect Egyptian women, and highlights the gender inequality within these.
Adultery laws in Egypt discriminate in favour of men. Under the law, men have only committed adultery if they have sex with a woman within the home they share with their wife, and with an unmarried woman outside the home (as an accomplice to adultery). However, if he has sex with an unmarried woman outside of the marital home, he has not committed adultery under the law. Women, on the other hand, are guilty of adultery if they have sex with a married or unmarried man within or outside of the marital home. Punishments vary too, with men facing up to six months in prison and women up to two years.
On the issue of abortion, Egyptian women fare little better. Women can only access an abortion if the pregnancy puts her life at risk. However a woman cannot have an abortion if she has been raped or is unable to take care of the child for social or economic reasons, as well as for health and mental health reasons, or due to foetal impairment.xxiv
On The Street (Sexual Harassment)
Sexual harassment is conceptualized, experienced and narrated differently by men and women. The majority of women tend to define a broad range of actions as sexual harassment including catcalls, comments, looks, noises, gestures. Many men on the other hand perceive these acts as fun, innocent teasing or compliments…Women talk about incidents of sexual harassment differently than men, with women speaking about feelings of fear, guilt, irritation, disgust, and frustration and men describing their exposure to sexual harassment as amusing, entertaining, funny, flattering and trivial.
Harassmap, Towards a Safer City, 2014 xxv
Sexual harassment is one of Egypt’s most urgent social problems. In 2013, UN Women reported that 99.3% of Egyptian women have been sexually harassed, and sexual harassment was a key contributor towards Egypt’s ranking as the worst place in the Middle East to be a woman by the Thomson Reuters Foundation in late 2013.
Harassmap is one of the most active campaigns tackling sexual harassment in Egypt, taking direct action on the street and mobilizing citizens to volunteer as part of the movement, report harassment when they see it, and empowering them to access services if they have experienced harassment. The Harassmap is a tool for reporting and sharing incidents of harassment and assault anonymously. The reports are mapped digitally on an interactive and publicly accessible map, which features photos and videos of incidents made by victims and witnesses.xxvi
Harassmap defines sexual harassment as ‘any form of unwelcome words and/or actions of a sexual nature that violate a person’s body, privacy, or feelings and make that person feel uncomfortable, threatened, insecure, scared, disrespected, startled, insulted, intimidated, abused, offended, or objectified,’ and lists (and defines) ogling, facial expressions, catcalls, comments, stalking or following, sexual invites, unwanted attention, sexual photos, online contact or phone calls, touching, indecent exposure, threat, and mob harassment as forms of sexual harassment.xxvii
‘Sexual harassment is a crime according to Egyptian law. Harassers can, should, and have been charged based on articles 306 (a) and 306 (b) of the Penal Code. According to the law, verbal, behavioral, phone and online sexual harassment will attract a prison sentence of 6 months – 5 years, and up to LE 50,000 in fines‘.xxviii
Nationalism is one of the greatest dangers to Egyptian women. Deeply ingrained the consciousness of the wider public is the need to preserve Egypt’s reputation. Consequently, for the many, silence is the simplest solution to Egypt’s most pressing social problems, particularly sexual harassment. If the problem is not acknowledged, it needn’t be addressed. Problems like sexual harassment befoul Egypt’s status as the greatest nation in the world, and are consequently afforded little or no acknowledgement. Where acknowledgement exists, a culture of victim-blaming persists. As a consequence, laws against harassment are rarely enforced, and perpetrators are almost never identified, investigated and charged.
On March 16 2014 a mob of students verbally, physically, and sexually assaulted a female student while she walked on campus at Cairo University’s Faculty of Law. The incident, which was filmed and uploaded to the Internet, was widely condemned by civil society, and yet the President of Cairo University Dr Gaber Nassar publicly excused the perpetrators on national television, blaming the victim for her ‘inappropriate clothing’, and promising that both the victim and the perpetrators would be disciplined. The uproar that followed forced Nassar to retract the statement, and he instead promised that the victim would not be disciplined but, rather, called as a witness to the incident. The extent to which Nassar’s volte-face was sincere is questionable, and yet the fury with which his original statement was met is a promising sign that civil society, the street, and the wider public are speaking out against sexual harassment in increasing numbers and with growing strength. In the case of the Cairo University mob assault, it took only a week for Nassar to withdraw his statement and condemn the assault.xxix
In the summer of 2013, during the crackdown on ‘terror’ following the coup, sexual violence against women featured as part of a wider programme of violence and collective punishment against the public. According to EIPR, ‘the state bears primary responsibility for what may be the worst acts of violence in Egypt’s modern history, with thousands killed and injured’.xxx
During street celebrations for the President on the third and eighth of June 2014, mass sexual harassment and assault occurred, including rape, gang-rape, and rape with sharp objects, leaving many victims with severe physical injuries. Condemning the wave of assaults, civil society reiterated its call for a clearer definition of rape and sexual assault in articles 267 and 268 of the Egyptian penal code, and for an independent investigation into the crimes.xxxi
In July 2014, seven men were sentenced to life in prison for attempted rape, attempted murder, and torture, marking a victory for the movement against sexual harassment and the largest case of its kind. A further two men were sentenced to twenty years and were ordered to pay compensation, and are to be placed under surveillance for an additional five years after they are released from prison. Following several high profile assaults on women (some filmed and shared online) President Sisi issued a condemnation of sexual harassment, building on the work of Adly Mansour, who made sexual harassment a punishable criminal offence for the first time in Egypt’s history (Article 306B).xxxii
Despite steps in the right direction, sexual harassment continued to plague the streets, in particular during public holidays and celebrations. During Eid-el-Fitr in July 2015, 141 reports of sexual harassment were made to the police — 136 verbal and five physical. The campaign ‘I Saw Harassment’ reported that sexual harassment during Eid-el-Fitr 2015 was higher than in previous years, and yet the number of women choosing to report their assault was likely to be limited due to the reluctance of ‘women to break the social stigma and report sexual harassment incidents as there is no guarantee that their data will not be leaked or that there would be a mechanism to support them’.xxxiii
Just three months earlier, the cabinet launched its National Strategy to Combat Violence Against Women, calling on the National Council for Women to develop a strategy to be implemented during the period 2015-2020. EIPR reviewed the strategy and describes it as a ‘confused step in the right direction’ and ‘believes that the definitions it adopts to describe the phenomenon are not adequate’, noting that ‘the document restricts itself to problematic definitions found in the Egyptian Penal Code, which use a morally charged language and do not offer adequate protection for potential victims of violence. Similarly, the categorization of forms of sexual violence – rampant in Egypt – are similarly limited and narrowly construed, failing to mention collective sexual assaults and sexual violence by the security apparatus, the most dangerous and frequent types of sexual violence facing Egyptian women’. Here, EIPR is referring to the term ‘hatk ‘ird’, which means ‘to defile the honour of another’. This vague term is hugely problematic and unsuitable as a definition of sexual violence, particularly for the purpose of developing an appropriate strategy to prevent and combat different forms of sexual violence, including and notably when creating educational resources. Additionally, EIPR notes that the terms ‘is problematic insofar as it links assault with women’s honour rather than her physical safety. It is thus a moralistic term’.xxxiv
Both the state and the street has seen women’s rights as a secondary priority; a luxury, even. Gender equality, perhaps more than any other issue, has become an expendable chip on the negotiating table. When determining the legitimacy of a candidate, a government, or a head of state, activists, movements, and the wider electorate have all too easily abandoned considerations of gender equality in favour, for instance, of preferable economic policies and opposition or an absence of ties to the NDP and (more recently) the Muslim Brotherhood.
Nationalism enables sexual violence against women. Efforts by witnesses to hush women confronting harassers on the street, and the harassment and intimidation perpetrated by state actors against civil society and the movement calling for gender equality reveals Egypt’s priorities; that minimising national shame and elevating national pride are significantly more important than the safety of its citizens. This attitude enables both state and non-state actors to commit crimes against women with impunity. Absolute transparency is needed in order to ensure that state-perpetrated, sponsored, or allowed violence against women is properly investigated and addressed. However the patriarchal and nationalistic character of the state remains intact only as long as the patriarchal and nationalistic character of wider society is thriving. While gains have been made since the time of the military coup, endemic issues such as sexual harassment persist, and measures put in place by the state have not adequately remedied the issues. Grassroots action has made the most headway, however the reluctance of civil society to participate in international fora is troubling. Women are leading the revolution still, though their participation threatens their lives and wellbeing. Activist and journalist Mona Eltahawy, who survived a sexual and physical assault by security forces in November 2011, urges us towards steadfastness and reminds women of the importance of challenging harmful structures within the home as well as on the street. ‘We might have removed Hosni Mubarak in Egypt… but until the rage shifts from the oppressors in our presidential palaces to the oppressors on our streets and in our homes-unless we topple the Mubaraks in our mind, in our bedrooms and on our street corners-our revolution has not even begun’.
xxiii http://www.girlsnotbrides.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Fact-sheet-Egypt-national-strategy-May-2015.pdf; http://www.girlsnotbrides.org/child-marriage/egypt; http://egyptianstreets.com/2014/07/23/the-story-behind-child-brides-in-egypt.